State v. Neal Appellant\u27s Brief Dckt. 40076 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
2-21-2013
State v. Neal Appellant's Brief Dckt. 40076
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law.
Recommended Citation
"State v. Neal Appellant's Brief Dckt. 40076" (2013). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 773.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/773
v. 
NEAL, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
NO. 40076 
ADA COUNTY NO. 1 2350 
APP 
APPEAL FROM DISTRICT COURT FOURTH JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT OF STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF ADA 
HONORABLE MICHAEL E. WETHERELL 
District Judge 
SARA 8. THOMAS 
State Appellate Public Defender 
State of Idaho 
l.S.B. #5867 
ERIK R. LEHTINEN 
Chief, Appellate Unit 
l.S.B. #6247 
SALLY J. COOLEY 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
l.S.B. #7353 
3050 N. Lake Harbor Lane, Suite 100 
Boise, ID 83703 
(208) 334-2712 
ATTORNEYS FOR 
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 
(208) 334-4534 
ATTORNEY FOR 
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT 
PAGE 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................. iii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ............................................................................... 1 
Nature of the Case ..................................................................................... 1 
Statement of the Facts and 
Course of Proceedings .............................................................................. 1 
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL ..................................................................... 5 
ARGUMENT ........................................................................................................ 6 
The District Court Erred When It Denied Ms. Neal's Motion 
To Dismiss The State's Information Due To A Lack Of 
Probable Cause To Support The Offense Charged ................................... 6 
A. Introduction ............................................................................................. 6 
B. Standard Of Review ................................................................................. 6 
C. The District Court Erred When It Denied Ms. Neal's Motion 
To Dismiss The State's Information Due To A Lack Of 
Probable Cause ...................................................................................... 7 
1. The Plain Language Of l.C. § 37-2732(c) 
Is Not Ambiguous ................................................................................. 9 
a. The State Has Offered No Evidence Of Knowledge ...................... 10 
b. The State Has Failed To Offer Evidence That 
Ms. Neal Exercised Dominion or Control 
Over The Controlled Substance ................................................... 11 
c. The State Failed To Establish "Possession" By 
Ms. Neal As The Controlled Substance Was Not 
Found In Ms. Neal's Blood ............................................................ 16 
2. Alternatively, To The Extent There Is An Ambiguity Within 
The Statute, Pursuant To The Rule Of Lenity, It Must Be 
Interpreted In Favor Of Ms. Neal ........................................................ 18 
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................... 21 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING .................................................................. 22 
ii 
Bradbury v. Idaho Judicial Council, 149 Idaho 107 (2009) .................................. 6 
Evans v. State, 132 So. 601 (Ala. Ct. App. 1931) ............................................... 15 
In the Matterof R.L.H., 116 P.3d 791(Mont.2005) ............................................ 15 
Jackson v. State, 833 S.W. 2d 220 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992) .................................... 17 
Johnson v. State, 602 So. 2d 1288 (Fla. 1992) ............................................ 17, 19 
McGee v. JD. Lumber, 135 Idaho 328 (2000) .................................................... 8 
Mitchell v. Bingham, 130 Idaho 420 (1997) ......................................................... 8 
People v. Spann, Cal.App.3d 400, 403 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) ................. 11, 13, 15 
State v. Alexander, No. CF-92-2047 (Okla. Dist. Ct. Tulsa Cty. Aug. 31, 1992). 18 
State v. Anderson, 145 Idaho 99 (2007) ........................................................ 20 
State v. Beard, 135 Idaho 641 (Ct. App. 2001) .................................................... 9 
State v. Betancourt, 151 Idaho 635 (Ct. App. 2011) ........................................... 11 
State v. Bumight, 132 Idaho 654 (1999) .............................................................. 9 
State v. Downes, 52 P.2d 1328 (Or. Ct. App. 1977) ..................................... 13, 15 
State v. Ephraim, 152 Idaho 176 (Ct. App. 2011) ................................................. 6 
State v. Flinchpaugh, 659 P.2d 208 (Kan. 1983) ................................... 11, 12, 15 
State v. Fox, 124 Idaho 924 (1993) ................................................................ 9, 10 
State v. Garza, 112 Idaho 778 (Ct. App. 1987) ......................................... 8, 11, 17 
State v. Gomez, 126 Idaho 700, 706 (Ct. App. 1994) ..................................... 8, 10 
State v. Hadley, 122 Idaho 728 (Ct. App. 1992) ................................................. 13 
State v. Hornaday, 713 P.2d 71 (Wash. 1986) ............................................. 11, 15 
iii 
State v. Lewis, 394 N.W. 2d 212 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) .................................... 15 
State v. Luster, 419 E.2d (Ga. Ct. App. 1992) ........................................... 19 
State v. Martinez-Gonzalez, 152 Idaho 775 (Ct. App. 2012) ................................ 6 
State v. McCoy, 128 Idaho 362 (1996) ............................................................... 20 
State v. McLellan, Idaho_, 2013 Opinion No. 5, Docket No. 39102, p. 4 
(Ct. App. 2013) .................................................................................................. 7 
State v. Reyes, 139 Idaho 502 (Ct. App. 2003) .................................................. 6 
State v. Stefani, 142 Idaho 698 (Ct. App. 2005) ................................................. 10 
State v. Thronsen, 809 P.2d 941 (Alaska App. 1 ) ........................................ 1 
State v. Vorm, 570 N. 2d 109 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) ......................................... 15 
United States v. LeCoe, 936 F.2d 398 (91h Cir. 1991) ...................................... . 
Verska v. St. Alphonsus Reg'/ Med. Ctr., 151Idaho889 (2011) ......................... 20 
Statutes 
1.C. § 18-8004 ..................................................................................................... 14 
l.C. § 37-2732 ............................................................................................. passim 
1.C. § 39-301 ....................................................................................................... 13 
Rules 
l.C.R. 5.1(b) ................................................................................................... 7,16 
Additional Authorities 
Black's Law Dictionary (9th Ed. 2009) ................................................................ 12 
Report of the American Medical Association Board of Trustees, Legal 
Interventions During Pregnancy, 264 JAMA 2663, 2669 (Nov. 28, 1990) ....... 19 
iv 
American Public Health Association 1990 Policy Statement ........................... 19 
v 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This appeal presents several questions that appear to be issues of first 
impression in Idaho. Ms. Neal was convicted, following a conditional plea of guilty, of 
one count of possession of a controlled substance under Idaho Code§ 37-2732(c). 
Ms. Neal was charged with possession of methadone because she gave birth to 
a child whose umbilical cord blood tested positive for methadone. Ms. Neal asserts that 
probable cause did not exist for the court to find that she "possessed" a controlled 
substance where the only evidence of the substance was a positive blood test, and that 
the presence of a controlled substance in the umbilical cord blood of her newborn baby 
does not establish probable cause for a charge of possession of a controlled substance 
against her. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
On March 27, 2011, Ms. Neal gave birth to a baby girl, B.N. (Preliminary Hearing 
Exhibit 2, p.118.) 1 Immediately after she was born, B.N. appeared to be exhibiting signs 
of narcotic withdrawal. (Preliminary Hearing Exhibit 2, p.123.) Ms. Neal was 
questioned, and provided information regarding her prescription for a painkiller 
containing the opiates hydrocodone and oxycodone, to treat a pilonidal cyst. 2 
(Preliminary Hearing Exhibit 2, p.121.) However, B.N.'s cord blood also tested positive 
1 All references to "Preliminary Hearing Exhibit 2" refer to the bates numbers stamped at 
the bottom of each page of the exhibit, and not the PDF pages of the electronic copy of 
the exhibits. 
2 The prescriptions for these medications were lawfully obtained. (11/17/11 Tr., p.7, 
Ls.10-12.) 
1 
for methadone,3 a drug which Ms. Neal admitted that she was never prescribed. 
(Preliminary Hearing Exhibit p.123.) Notably, both Ms. Neal and B.N. tested negative 
for methadone; only B.N.'s cord blood had a positive test result for methadone. 
(Presentence Investigation, p.3.) Ms. Neal maintained that she did not know how the 
methadone came to be in the cord blood, as she did not knowingly ingest any 
methadone during her pregnancy. (11/17/11 Tr., p.6, L.13 - p.7, L.9.) 
On August 11, 2011, almost six months after the birth of B.N., the State charged 
Ms. Neal with felony possession of a controlled substance, methadone, in violation of 
l.C. § 37-2732(c), based upon the lab results which found methadone in the umbilical 
cord blood of B.N. (R., pp.5-6, 25-26.) A preliminary hearing was held, and the 
committing magistrate judge bound Ms. Neal over to answer to the charge in district 
court. (R., pp.23-24.) The magistrate judge found probable cause to believe that 
"Ms. Neal possessed a controlled substance and that she is the individual who 
possessed it," based on the testimony of the detective who spoke to Ms. Neal at the 
hospital and the medical records of Ms. Neal and B.N. (11/17/11 Tr., p.14, Ls.12-18.) 
Counsel for Ms. Neal filed a Motion to Dismiss Information and Brief in Support of 
Motion to Dismiss. (R., pp.38-50.) Ms. Neal argued that an individual cannot be 
convicted of possession of a controlled substance based solely on the results of a blood 
test which identified a controlled substance in the defendant's baby's cord blood for 
which she did not have a valid prescription. (R., pp.41-42.) At the hearing on her 
Motion to Dismiss, Ms. Neal asked the district court to adopt the majority rule in other 
states that the mere presence, without additional corroborating evidence, of a controlled 
3 Ms. Neal acknowledges that the blood test was positive for methadone for purposes of 
this appeal only. 
2 
substance in a person's body does not constitute possession within the meaning of the 
criminal possession of controlled substance statutes. (11/17/11 Tr., p.1, L.13 - p.17, 
L.19; R., pp.42-50.) The State countered that it did produce evidence of possession 
other than a positive drug test; that evidence being that Ms. Neal admitted that she did 
not have, nor had she previously received a valid prescription for, methadone.4 
(State's Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, R., pp.55-57.) 
After hearing the arguments of counsel, the district court denied Ms. Neal's 
motion to dismiss. (R., pp.62-69; Tr. 3/14112.) The district court examined the out-of-
state cases cited by Ms. Neal, which hold that evidence of a controlled substance in 
one's body, standing alone, is not sufficient to sustain a conviction, but found that 
"Ms. Neai did not cite any authority that supports the contention that a positive blood or 
urine test, by itself, is insufficient to support probable cause." (R., p.67.) Ms. Neal 
entered a conditional guilty plea to the charge of felony possession of a controlled 
substance, preserving her right to challenge the district court's denial of her motion to 
dismiss on appeal; in exchange, the State agreed to limit its recommendation to an 
underlying sentence of seven years unified, with two years fixed, and to recommend 
probation. (R., pp.71-72; Tr. 4/19/12, p.39, L.9-p.40, L.1.) The district court accepted 
Ms. Neal's Alforc/5 plea and ordered a substance abuse evaluation and a Presentence 
Investigation (hereinafter, PSI). (Tr. 4/19/12, p.53, L.25 - p.55, L.8.) The district court 
imposed a withheld judgment, and placed Ms. Neal on probation for a period of five 
4 The State's argument missed the mark, as the issue set forth by Ms. Neal in her Brief 
in Support of Motion to Dismiss was whether Ms. Neal "possessed" methadone within 
the meaning of the statute, not whether methadone was lawfully obtained. Ms. Neal 
conceded that she did not have a valid prescription for methadone and had not been 
~rescribed methadone. 
See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). 
3 
(R., pp.73-81, 62-69; Tr. 6/14/1 p.15, Ls.11-16.) Ms. Neal filed a timely Notice 
of Appeal. (R., pp.84-86.) 
4 
ISSUE 
Did the district court err by denying Ms. Neal's motion to dismiss? 
5 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred When It Denied Ms. Neal's Motion To Dismiss The State's 
Information Due To A Lack Of Probable Cause To Support The Offense Charged 
A. Introduction 
Ms. Neal asserts that the erred in denying her motion to dismiss the State's 
information based upon the failure of the State to establish probable cause for every 
element of the charged offense. Specifically, the State failed to establish that Ms. Neal 
had both knowledge of the methadone and exercised dominion and control over the 
methadone found in her newborn's umbilical cord blood. 
Standard Of Review 
When reviewing a finding of probable cause, this Court defers to the findings of 
fact of the lower court that are supported by substantial evidence, but this Court reviews 
de nova whether those facts as found constitute probable cause. State v. Martinez-
Gonzalez, 152 Idaho 775, 778 (Ct. App. 2012). 
In addition, this Court reviews the application and construction of statutes de 
nova. State v. Ephraim, 152 Idaho 176, 177 (Ct. App. 2011). In doing so, this Court is 
obligated to give effect to every word and phrase within the statute, to avoid a 
construction that would render any portion of the statute a nullity, and to further avoid 
treating any of the terms within the statute as mere surplusage. See, e.g., Bradbury v. 
Idaho Judicial Council, 149 Idaho 107, 116 (2009); Ephraim, 152 Idaho at 177; State v. 
Reyes, 139 Idaho 502, 505 (Ct. App. 2003). 
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C. The District Court Erred When It Denied Ms. Neal's Motion To Dismiss The 
State's Information Due To A Lack Of Probable Cause 
There was insufficient evidence to support a finding of probable cause for the 
offense of possession of a controlled substance under l.C. § 37-2732(c). At a 
preliminary hearing, the state is required to present evidence "upon every material 
element of the offense charged." l.C.R. 5.1(b). The state presents its theory of the 
charge, both through argument and by the complaint filed, and then the magistrate 
examines the charge from the state, along with the evidence presented, to determine 
whether "a public offense has been committed and [if] there is probable or sufficient 
cause to believe that the defendant committed such offense. l.C.R. 5.1(b); State v. 
McLellan, _ Idaho_, 2013 Opinion No. 5, Docket No. 39102, p. 4 (Ct. App. 2013). 
Further, although the magistrate is entitled to rely on the theory and argument set forth 
by the state, there is no requirement that the magistrate search the record and the law 
to find alternate theories of the case for the state to proceed under. McLel/an, at p. 4. 
"The duty to proffer theories of a case under which the state wishes to proceed rests 
solely with the state, as it possesses the power to bring and subsequently seek to 
amend and prosecute charges." Id. 
The State alleged that Ms. Neal was in possession of a controlled substance, 
methadone, because methadone was present in the umbilical cord blood of her 
newborn. Ms. Neal admitted that she had not been prescribed methadone, but denied 
ever taking methadone. No evidence corroborating Ms. Neal's claim was introduced or 
admitted, nor was any evidence contradicting Ms. Neal's claim introduced. (See 
11/17/11 Tr.) In this case, the State, in both its initial criminal complaint and its 
Information, charged Ms. Neal with felony possession of a controlled substance 
7 
pursuant to l.C. § 37-2732(c). (R., pp.5-6, 25-26.) The relevant portion of this statutory 
provision provides that: 
It is unlawful for any person to possess a controlled substance unless the 
substance was obtained directly from, or pursuant to, a valid prescription 
or order of a practitioner while acting in the course of his professional 
practice, or except as otherwise authorized by this chapter. 
Idaho Code § 37-2732(c). Possession of a controlled substance may be actual or 
constructive. State v. Gomez, 126 Idaho 700, 706 (Ct. App. 1994). When the 
defendant is not in actual physical possession, the State must show that the defendant 
had such knowledge and control of the substance as to establish constructive 
possession. Id. "[C]onstructive possession exists where a nexus between the 
accused and the controlled substance is sufficiently proven so as to give rise to the 
reasonable inference that the accused was not simply a bystander but, rather, had the 
power and the intent to exercise dominion or control over the [drugs]." State v. Garza, 
112 Idaho 778, 784 (Ct. App. 1987) (holding that although proximity alone will not prove 
possession, defendant's nonexclusive control over premises where evidence was 
found, combined with his knowledge of the marijuana, and his written records of 
frequent business transactions with persons engaged in drug dealings, showed both 
power and intent to exercise control over the marijuana). 
The "possession" language of l.C. § 37-2732(c), when applied to whether a 
person can "possess" a controlled substance when the substance is only found in the 
individual's blood has not previously been interpreted by any Idaho appellate court and 
is therefore an issue of first impression. Construction and application of statutes are 
purely legal questions, and therefore reviewing courts exercise free review. McGee v. 
JD. Lumber, 135 Idaho 328, 332 (2000); Mitchell v. Binghal?), 130 Idaho 420 
(1997). "The language of the statute has to be given its plain, obvious, and rational 
8 
meaning." State v. Burnight, 1 Idaho 654, 659 (1999). "\Nhere the language of a 
statute is plain and unambiguous, th[e] court must give effect to the statute as written, 
without engaging in statutory construction." State v. Beard, 135 Idaho 641, 646 
(Ct. App. 2001 ). 
Ms. Neal does not contest that methadone was found in the umbilical cord blood 
of her baby. Ms. Neal also does not dispute that she did not have a prescription for 
methadone. What Ms. Neal does challenge is that the district court's conclusion that 
because methadone was present in the umbilical cord blood of B.N., she "possessed" 
methadone in violation of l.C. § 37-2732(c). 
1. The Plain Language Of l.C. § 37-2732(c) Is Not Ambiguous 
The State failed to show that Ms. Neal "possessed" the methadone in B.N.'s cord 
blood. Although Idaho Code § 37-2732(c) does not require any mental state as an 
element of the crime; the Idaho Supreme Court has held that "the offense requires a 
general intent that is, the knowledge that one is in possession of the substance" 
whether it be marijuana, cocaine, or another controlled substance. State v. Fox, 124 
Idaho 924, 926 (1993). However, the individual need not know the substance 
possessed is a controlled substance. Id. In determining whether intent was an element 
of the crime of possession of a controlled substance, the Idaho Supreme Court in Fox 
stated: "whether a criminal intent is a necessary element of a statutory offense is a 
matter of construction, to be determined from the language of the statute in view of its 
manifest purpose and design .... " Id. at 925 (quoting State v. Sterrett, 35 Idaho 580, 
9 
583 (1922)). The Court went on to conclude that "knowledge that one is in possession 
of the substance" is an essential element of the offense.6 Fox, 1 Idaho at 926. 
In this case, actual possession is not an issue, as both the Complaint and the 
Information charged her specifically with constructive possession of the methadone. 
(R., pp.5-6, 25-26.) Thus, the State must show that Ms. Neal had both knowledge and 
control of the substance in order to establish constructive possession. See Gomez, 126 
Idaho at 706. 
a. The State Has Offered No Evidence Of Knowledge 
The State failed to show that Ms. Neal had knowledge of the presence of the 
methadone in B.N.'s cord blood. Under Idaho law, it is clear that a defendant must have 
knowledge of his possession of a controlled substance. See l.C. § 37-2732(c); State v. 
Fox, 124 Idaho 924, 926 (1993). 
To satisfy the requirement to establish the material elements under l.C. § 37-
2732(c), the State must have shown Ms. Neal's knowledge that she was in possession 
of the substance. See Fox, 124 Idaho at 926. However, while Ms. Neal admitted to 
Detective McGilvery that she had been prescribed and was taking the prescription 
painkiller Norco, which contained the drug Hydrocodone, she denied that she had taken 
any methadone. (11/17/11 Tr., p.7, Ls.1-12.) Although the question of whether the 
defendant knew of the presence of a drug in a vehicle may be corroborated by the 
6 In 2005, the Idaho Court of Appeals explained the rationale behind the intent element: 
The purpose of the intent element in the definition of a possession offense 
is to separate innocent, accidental, or inadvertent conduct from criminal 
behavior. 
State v. Stefani, 142 Idaho 698, 704 (Ct. App. 2005). 
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presence of the same controlled substance in the defendant's body, evidence consisting 
solely of a blood test is insufficient to establish knowledge alone. See State v. 
Betancourt, 151 Idaho 635, 638 (Ct. App. 2011). 
In this case, the State did not introduce any evidence to corroborate the mere 
presence of the substance in the blood in order to establish the knowledge element.7 
The State therefore failed to establish Ms. Neal had knowledge of the presence of 
methadone in B.N.'s umbilical cord blood. 
b. The State Has Failed To Offer Evidence That Ms. Neal Exercised 
Dominion or Control Over The Controlled Substance 
The State failed to show that Ms. Neal had dominion or control over the 
methadone in B.N.'s cord blood. Under Idaho law, it is clear that a defendant must have 
dominion or control over the controlled substance in order to establish that the 
defendant constructively "possessed" the substance. See Garza, 112 Idaho at 784. 
However, once a substance enters a person's body, that person no longer has the 
ability to control the substance. See State v. F/inchpaugh, 659 P.2d at 211; People v. 
Spann, Cal.App.3d 400, 403 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986); State v. Hornaday, 713 P.2d 71 
(Wash. 1986). Thus, because that language of a statute must be given its plain, 
obvious, and rational meaning, "possess" is defined as "[t]o have in one's actual control; 
7 Further, as a matter of policy, significant concerns would arise should the State no 
longer be required to prove the knowledge element in a possession of controlled 
substance case. For example, as a general policy, exceptions would have to be carved 
out for specific substances. For example, one such exception should be enacted for the 
date rape drug, Rohypnol, which is typically slipped into a victim's drink without his/her 
knowledge. Yet, should the term "possess" be interpreted to mean that an individual 
may be prosecuted whenever a substance was present in the defendant's blood, a 
victim of "roofies" could be guilty of possession of a controlled substance. The 
legislature would thus have to craft an exception for those persons who involuntarily had 
a controlled substance in their blood. 
11 
to have possession of." Black's Law Dictionary (9th Ed. 2009). Further, "control" is 
given the ordinary meaning of the word, that is, "[t]o exercise power or influence over." 
Black's Law Dictionary (9th Ed. 2009). Ms. Neal did not have possession or control 
over the substance in B.N.'s umbilical cord blood. 
In Flinchpaugh, the defendant moved to dismiss after the magistrate found 
probable cause at a preliminary hearing. (R., p.43.) The trial court granted the 
defendant's motion, and the State appealed. Flinchpaugh, 659 P.2d at 209. The 
Supreme Court of Kansas affirmed the district court's decision, holding that evidence of 
a controlled substance in the defendant's blood did not establish possession of the 
substance; nor was it adequate circumstantial evidence to show prior possession by the 
defendant, since the drug could have been injected involuntarily or introduced by 
artifice. The Kansas Supreme Court found that once a controlled substance is in a 
person's blood, the power of that person to control,8 possess, use, dispose of, or cause 
harm is at an end, and thus evidence of a controlled substance after it has been 
introduced into a person's blood does not establish possession of that substance. Id. 
659 P.2d at 211. 
The Idaho legislature did choose to make illegal simply the presence of a 
controlled substance in an individual's blood. In 1996, the Idaho Legislature 
criminalized the "use" of controlled substances under l.C. § 37-2732C: 
"[i]t is unlawful for any person ... to use or be under the influence of any 
controlled substance specified [herein], except when administered by or 
under the direction of a person licensed by the state to dispense, 
prescribe, or administer controlled substances. 
l.C. § 37-2732C(a). 
12 
This statute proscribes very different conduct than l.C. § 37-2732(c), depending 
entirely on whether the defendant is found to have "possessed" a controlled substance 
or merely to have "used" one. Whereas a finding of "possession" is a felony, and upon 
conviction, the defendant may be imprisoned for up to seven years or fined up to 
$15,000, or both, a finding of "use" is only· a misdemeanor, punishable by a maximum 
fine of $1,000 and imprisonment in the county jail for up to six months. 
Separate statutes criminalizing possession and use/being under the influence 
have also been enacted in numerous other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Spann, Cal.App.3d 
at 408; State v. Downes, 572 P.2d at 1330. 
Because the legislature has specifically enacted separate legislation to punish 
those individuals who have been using or observed as being under the influence of a 
controlled substance, this Court should find that "use" should not metamorphose into 
"possession." See l.C. § 37-2732C. The legislature enacted a "use" statute to provide 
criminal sanctions against an individual using or suspected of being under the influence 
of a controlled substance. 9 The legislature, by its separate categorization and 
punishment of the offenses, has concluded that these are separate offenses, with 
separate elements. To find otherwise would negate the existence of l.C. § 37-2732C 
prohibiting "use" of controlled substances. 
8 The Supreme Court in Flinchpaugh also examined the ordinary meaning of "control", 
finding it meant "to exercise restraining or directing influence over." Id. (internal citations 
omitted). 
9 Although the criminalization of drug addiction by prosecuting those under the influence 
of controlled substances seems inapposite to the Idaho Alcoholism and Intoxication 
Treatment Act, l.C. § 39-301. The Idaho Alcoholism and Intoxication Treatment Act 
eliminated the status offense of alcoholism, providing that "intoxicated persons will not 
be subjected to criminal prosecution or incarceration solely because of their 
consumption of alcohol." l.C. § 39-301. State v. Hadley, 122 Idaho 728, 732 (Ct. App. 
1992). 
13 
Moreover, the legislature knew how to craft statutes where a defendant violates 
the law by having a specific amount of the substance in his/her blood, for example, the 
statue prohibiting driving under the influence of alcohol, drugs or any other intoxicating 
substances states: 
(1 )(a) It is unlawful for any person who is under the influence of alcohol, 
drugs or any other intoxicating substances. . . or who as an alcohol 
concentration of 0.08, ... or more, as shown by analysis of his blood, 
urine, or breath, to drive or be in actual physical control of a motor vehicle 
within this state. 
l.C. § 18-8004. 
The legislature could have easily written l.C. § 37-2732(c) to say "possess, or be 
under the influence of a controlled substance" to encompass those with a controlled 
substance in their blood. Under such a set of circumstances, it would have been 
apparent the legislature was attempting to make it illegal to have a controlled substance 
inside a person's body. Instead, l.C. § 37-2732(c) provides: 
It is unlawful for any person to possess a controlled substance unless the 
substance was obtained directly from, or pursuant to, a valid prescription 
or order of a practitioner while acting in the course of his professional 
practice, or except as otherwise authorized by this chapter. 
Idaho Code § 37-2732(c). The statute is devoid of any reference to blood analysis or 
language such as "under the influence," similar to what is set forth in l.C. § 18-8004, 
further indicating that the legislature did not intend to include those individuals with 
controlled substances in their blood within the scope of the possession statute. 
As Idaho appellate courts have not previously addressed this question in light of 
the unique set of facts present in this case, we can turn to the case law of other 
jurisdictions in our analysis of when dominion or control may establish "possession." 
While not controlling, the law regarding "possession" in other states may be 
informative. In People v. Spann, the California Court of Appeals rejected the 
14 
proposition that possession of a controlled substance may be proven by its use, finding 
that after consumption the user no longer has dominion and control over the substance 
consumed and hence does not possess it "We agree for the obvious reason that a 
person is not in control of a substance that is en route through his digestive 
system." People v. Spann, Cal.App.3d 400, 403 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986); see also Evans v. 
State, 132 So. 601 (Ala. Ct. App. 1931) (prohibition era case holding that whisky was 
not "possessed" when it "is in the man" after consumption); State v. Downes, 52 P.2d 
1328, 1330 (Or. Ct. App. 1977) (phencyclidine (PCP) is not possessed by the user after 
it has been injected into his arm). 
The majority rule in other jurisdictions seems to be that the mere presence of a 
controlled substance in an individual's body does not constitute possession within the 
meaning of criminal statutes. See State v. Vorm, 570 N.E. 2d 109 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) 
(holding that the mere presence of a controlled substance in blood or urine is 
circumstantial evidence of prior possession but insufficient to sustain a conviction 
without additional corroborating evidence); State v. Lewis, 394 N.W. 2d 212 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 1986) (holding that the usual and ordinary meaning of the term possession 
does not include substances injected into the body and assimilated into the system); 
State v. Hornaday, 713 P.2d 71 (Wash. 1986) ("Once a narcotic is injected into the vein, 
or swallowed orally, it is no longer in the individual's control for purposes of 
possession."); State v. Flinchpaugh, 659 P.2d 208 (Kan. 1983) (concluding that once a 
controlled substance is within a person's system the power of the person to control 
possess use dispose of or cause harm is at an end); State v. Thronsen, 809 P.2d 941 
(Alaska App. 1991) (holding that defendant could not be convicted of possession of 
cocaine "in his body"); In the Matter of R.L.H., 116 P.3d 791 (Mont. 2005) (holding that 
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the presence of a controlled substance in a person's blood constitutes sufficient 
circumstantial evidence to prove prior possession only when accompanied by other 
corroborating evidence of knowing and voluntary possession). 
Accordingly, this Court should hold that the district court erred in denying 
Ms. Neal's motion to dismiss because "dominion or control" over a controlled substance 
cannot be found where the controlled substance is present only in her blood. 
c. The State Failed To Establish "Possession" By Ms. Neal As The 
Controlled Substance Was Not Found In Ms. Neal's Blood 
The issue in this case is not simply whether probable cause existed to find that 
Ms. Neal possessed a controlled substance under l.C. § 37-2732(c) due to the 
presence of the substance in her blood, but whether the presence of the substance 
located only in her baby's cord blood could be used to establish that Ms. Neal 
possessed the substance in violation of the statute. Because the finding of probable 
cause must be based upon "substantial evidence" of "every material element of the 
offense charged," the district court erred in denying Ms. Neal's motion to dismiss. See 
l.C.R. 5.1(b). 
The district court erred in finding that Ms. Neal "possessed" a substance found in 
her baby's cord blood. l.C. § 37-2732(c) does not provide for the prosecution of 
mothers who have recently given birth to babies who have traces of a controlled 
substance in their blood. 
In this case, the only physical evidence against Ms. Neal is a test of her 
newborn's umbilical cord blood, which tested positive for methadone. Ms. Neal 
admitted that she did not have a prescription for methadone, but denied ever taking 
methadone during her pregnancy. However, this is insufficient to constitute probable 
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cause to believe that Ms. Neal "possessed" controlled substances in violation of 
l.C. § 37-2732(c). 
The mere presence of a controlled substance in the blood or urine of a newborn 
is insufficient evidence to establish probable cause to that the mother possessed a 
controlled substance in contravention of l.C. § 37-2732(c). As discussed herein, 
possession requires knowledge and the power and intent to exercise dominion or 
control over the controlled substance. See Garza, 112 Idaho ;;at 784. As this cannot be 
established solely based on the presence of a drug in the body, likewise the State's 
arguments regarding possession when the substance is not in the defendant's body, but 
instead is found in the defendant's baby's cord blood, fail. 
Other jurisdictions that have been faced with the issue of whether a woman may 
be charged with possession or distribution of a controlled substance based on residual 
drug metabolites in her infant have ruled the evidence to be insufficient. 
The Supreme Court of Florida ruled that cocaine metabolites found in an infant's 
urine after birth was insufficient evidence to convict the mother of delivery of a 
controlled substance. Johnson v. State, 602 So. 2d 1288 (Fla. 1992). Similarly, in the 
case of Jackson v. State, 833 S.W. 2d 220 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992), the Court of Appeals of 
Texas determined that the presence of residual drugs in an infant was insufficient 
grounds for charging the mother with possession. Id. at 223. In Jackson, the Court of 
Appeals declined to hold that a positive test result for drugs in bodily fluids satisfies the 
elements of the offense of cocaine possession. Jackson, 833 S.W. 2d 220. In 
Oklahoma, a district court dismissed charges of unlawful possession of a controlled 
substance brought against a woman who ingested illegal drugs while pregnant, finding 
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that the presence of drugs in the defendant's system does not constitute possession. 
v. Alexander, No. CF-92-2047 (Okla. Dist. Ct. Tulsa Cty. Aug. 31, 1992). 
Here, the State alleged in its Information that Ms. Neal committed the offense on 
April 2011; however, B.N. was eight days old on April 4, 2011. Because the only 
evidence introduced by the State at the preliminary hearing was evidence of the 
presence of methadone metabolites in B.N.'s cord blood, the State failed to offer any 
evidence of a date or place at which the alleged possession occurred. It appears that 
the State charged Ms. Neal with presently possessing methadone; yet on April 4, 2011, 
Ms. Neal did not control B.N.'s umbilical cord. No testimony was introduced as to how 
the methadone metabolites were introduced into the umbilical cord of B.N. (11/17/11 
Tr.) Because the State failed to show that Ms. Neal had the power to exercise dominion 
and control over the methadone in B.N.'s umbilical cord blood, or even the date or 
location that Ms. Neal allegedly ingested methadone, Ms. Neal cannot be prosecuted 
for the contents of her newborn baby's cord blood. 
2. Alternatively, To The Extent There Is An Ambiguity Within The Statute, 
Pursuant To The Rule Of Lenity, It Must Be Interpreted In Favor Of 
Ms. Neal 
If there is an ambiguity within l.C. § 37-2732(c), public policy considerations weigh 
heavily against prosecutions of drug addicted mothers. The prosecution of a mother for 
illegal use of controlled substances during pregnancy would serve only to dissuade 
drug-addicted mothers from seeking treatment or pre-natal medical care. Clearly the 
Idaho Legislature could not have intended such a result. Thus, rather than face the 
possibility of prosecution, pregnant substance abusers may simply avoid prenatal or 
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medical care for fear of being detected. 10 Johnson, 602 So. 2d at 1295-96. Yet the 
newborns of women are, as a group, the most fragile and sick, and most in need 
of hospital neonatal care. Id. at 1296. The California Medical Association has noted: 
[T]o bring criminal charges against a pregnant woman for activities which 
may be harmful to her fetus is inappropriate. Such prosecution is 
counterproductive to the public interest as it may discourage a woman 
from seeking prenatal care of dissuade her from providing accurate 
information to health care providers out of fear of self-incrimination. This 
failure to seek proper care or to withhold vital information concerning her 
health could increase the risks to herself and her baby. 
Report of the American Medical Association Board of Trustees, Legal Interventions 
During Pregnancy, 264 JAMA 2663, 2669 (Nov. 28, 1990). Such considerations led the 
American Medical Association Board of Trustees to oppose criminal sanctions for 
behavior by a pregnant woman toward her fetus. Id. at 2670. Likewise, the American 
Public Health Association recommends that no punitive measures be taken against 
pregnant women who are users of illegal drugs when no other illegal acts have been 
committed. See American Public Health Association 1990 Policy Statement. In 
Georgia, the Court of Appeals concluded that their legislation did not intend to 
prosecute pregnant women who ingest controlled substances. State v. Luster, 419 
S.E.2d 32 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992) (finding that legislature treated addiction in pregnancy as 
a disease and indicated a preference for treatment over prosecution). 
If this Court finds that l.C. § 37-2732(c) is ambiguous with regard to the 
"possession" language, the rule of lenity requires that it be construed in favor of 
Ms. Neal. Where the statute is not ambiguous, the appellate court is to give effect to 
the plain meanings of the terms in the statute. Verska v. St. Alphonsus Reg'/ Med. Ctr., 
10 Such enforcement would likely encourage women to abort their fetus, rather than face 
criminal prosecution for giving birth to a child who tests positive for illegal controlled 
substances. 
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151 Idaho 889, 895-96 (2011). However, should the Court find that the statute is 
ambiguous, the rule of lenity requires that ambiguity to be resolved in Ms. Neal's favor. 
e.g., State v. Anderson, 145 Idaho 99, 103 (2008). "It is well-settled that criminal 
statutes are to be construed strictly and in favor of the defendant." State v. McCoy, 128 
Idaho 362, 365 (1996). "[A]mbiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be 
resolved in favor of lenity." United States v. LeCoe, 936 F.2d 398, 402 (9th Cir. 1991) 
(quoting Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 811 (1971 )). The United States 
Supreme Court spoke to the cannons for interpreting an ambiguous statute in State v. 
Crandon, 494 U. 1 (1990). The Court stated: 
In determining the meaning of the statute, we look not only to the 
particular statutory language, but to the design of the statute as a whole 
and its object and policy. Moreover, because the governing standard is 
set forth in a criminal statute, it is appropriate to apply the rule of lenity in 
resolving any ambiguity in the ambit of the statute's coverage. To the 
extent that the language or history is uncertain, this "time-honored 
interpretive guideline" serves to ensure both that there is fair warning of 
the boundaries of criminal conduct and the legislatures, not courts, define 
criminal liability. 
Id. at 1001-1002. As is acknowledged above, criminal statutes are promulgated on the 
premise that they give notice to society regarding the bounds of the law, one of the 
quintessential requirements of due process of law. Inherent in the concept of fair 
warning and due process, the general public cannot be on notice of what might have 
been the legislature's intent or policy behind drafting a statute. 
The rule of lenity requires that in the interest of justice and to protect Ms. Neal's 
due process rights, this Court should refrain from ascertaining the possible intent of the 
legislature or the policies it might have had in mind in enacting the statute. Accordingly 
as is articulated herein, in order to show that Ms. Neal "possessed" the methadone 
within the meaning of l.C. § 37-2732(c), the State was required to show that Ms. Neal 
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had knowledge of the presence of methadone and that she exercised dominion and 
control over the methadone found in the umbilical cord blood of her newborn. Under 
this interpretation of the statute, because the State offered insufficient evidence to 
convict Ms. Neal of felony possession of a controlled substance, the district court's 
order denying her motion to dismiss should be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
Ms. Neal respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's Order 
denying Ms. Neal's Motion To Dismiss and vacate her conviction. 
DATED this 21st day of February, 201 
Public Defender 
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